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The Forgotten Phenomenology 
“Enactive Perception” in the Eyes of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty  
Roi Bar 
Freie Universitat Berlin 
Phenomenology is not dead yet, at least not from the viewpoint of the 
“phenomenology-friendly”1 approach that has recently emerged in cognitive 
science: the “enactive approach” to the mind or “enactivism.”2 In this 
approach, the mental capacities, such as perception, consciousness and 
cognition, do not emerge only as a result of brain activities, like in the 
reductionist explanation of the mental, known as cognitivism, especially 
computationalism.3 Rather, the mental capacities emerge as a result of the 
interaction between the brain, the body and the environment, where the mind 
“enacts” its own world.4 What makes this approach so fruitful for a renewed 
philosophical consideration is its ongoing reference to Husserl’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenologies.5 It was declared to be “consistent with Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point,” to be the “revival” of 
phenomenology, even a “Kuhnian revolution.”6 Evan Thompson, a 
proponent of the enactive theory, argues that this approach “uses 
phenomenology to explicate mind science and mind science to explicate 
phenomenology. Concepts such as lived body, organism, bodily selfhood and 
autonomous agency, the intentional arc and dynamic sensorimotor 
dependencies, can thus become mutually illuminating rather than merely 
correlational concepts.”7 The phenomenological works seem to strike a chord 
with the enactive theorists. Are we witnessing the dawn of “The new Science 
of the Mind”?8 
As is often the case with proclamations of revivals and new approaches, 
there are those who contest them, arguing that the orientation of the enactive 
approach “have little in common” with phenomenology.9 What reinforces this 
stance is the fact that enactivism is part of a broader project of “naturalizing” 
phenomenology.10 The question that arises is: To what extent are the premises 
and conclusions of the enactive approach consistent with those of the 
phenomenological approach? The nexus of enactivism and phenomenology 
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is surely very wide, and not all of its aspects can be covered here. I will thus 
concentrate on the notion of “enactive perception,” mainly in Alva Noë‘s 
Action in Perception, but also in others, and on its relation to some of Husserl’s 
ideas as well as to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and later 
ontology. Noë’s argument goes about the role of self-motion and 
sensorimotor knowledge in perceptual experience. Likewise, for Thompson, 
“to perceive is to exercise one’s skillful master of the ways sensory stimulation 
varies as a result of bodily movement.”11 Does their approach to perception 
overlap in any way with that of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty?  
In what follows I try to answer this question, starting with analyzing 
Noë’s concept of enactive perception as a physicalist attempt to overcome the 
challenge of representationalism with the help of empirical psychology. I then 
turn to Husserl’s phenomenology and the differences between its 
transcendental method and the enactive approach. I show that Noë’s solution 
of the Husserlian phenomenological problem of perception remains 
naturalistic, as it does not take the phenomenon of intersubjectivity and the 
constitution of a non-natural world, the “cultural world,” into account. 
Afterwards I turn to Merleau-Ponty and claim that there is some certain 
common ground with Noë, but also major differences. I conclude that the 
enactive approach is not completely refuted by the phenomenological one, 
insofar as the latter partly contains the first. Yet the enactive approach deals 
with the necessary conditions of perception qua animal perception, not with 
the sufficient conditions for the understanding of human perception. For this 
reason, enactivism and phenomenology are methodologically different 
projects: whereas enactivism makes do with the continuity of the axis brain-
body-environment, phenomenology goes beyond it to discuss the 
philosophical issues that are typical to human consciousness, like the question 
of freedom and the inquiry into the social, linguistic, and historical 
circumstances under which the understanding of the human mind is made 
possible. The reason why the recent turn of phenomenology into 
neurophenomenology is perceived as a “revival” is virtually inherent to the 
specific scientific ethos of the enactive approach and reveals a certain oblivion 
of the objectives of philosophical phenomenology. 
 
The Argument of Enactive Perception 
The point of departure of Noë’s argument is the refutation of 
representationalism, as demonstrated in Dennett’s “Cartesian theater” and 
Ryle’s “ghost in the machine.”12 He argues that perceptual experience does 
not amount to viewing pictures in the head. Against the physicalist 
internalism of John Searle who argues that all aspects of experience must have 
correlates in the neuronal reactions, because “mental states are both caused 
by the operations of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain,”13 Noë 
claims that perceptual experience does not emerge through mere 
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representations of objects in the brain, or, in other words, that neuronal 
activities and neuronal substrates are not sufficient for the determination of 
perception, because other physical substrates like head and eye movements 
as well as light conditions evidently play a constitutive role in perceptual 
experience. And so perception does not only happen in the head, it is rather a 
result of an interaction between our brain, our body, and the environment.14 
In the process of perception “we enact our perceptual experience; we act it 
out,” and by performing our experience “we enact the environment”15 and 
put it literally into effect. In the enactive view, perception does not just happen 
to us, we do it, and therefore it is not only an “action guidance,” but an action 
itself, indeed a “thoughtful activity,” a “skillful activity” that can be learned 
and trained. Although perception is apparently informed by representations 
instanced in the brain, that is by “content-bearing internal states,” it is rather 
a “skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole,”16 the performance of 
practical know-how knowledge.17 In short, Noë’s “active externalism” takes 
sensorimotor abilities to be that which conditions and constitutes perception. 
Similarly, Thompson makes efforts to demonstrate the same, namely that 
the neural states of a perceptual experience should not be described at the 
level of “intrinsic neurophysiological properties,” for it is rather the case that 
“as a skillful activity of the whole animal or person, perceptual experience 
emerges from the continuous and reciprocal (non-linear) interactions of 
sensory, motor and cognitive processes, and is thereby constituted by motor 
behavior, sensory stimulation, and practical knowledge.”18 Note that animal 
and person are exchangeable here and undergo the same kind of process of 
perception, spatial perception of objects. 
Noë’s “active externalism” rules out that perception can be understood 
as a passive ability like photographing, and consequently opposes the idea 
that perception is directly caused by the objects themselves, like in Peter 
Strawson’s causal theory of perception.19 Perception is not sensation caused 
by external stimulation in the model of stimulus-impression-perception in an 
input-output-system, for this would be a too mechanically shaped model. In 
a reaction against Hume’s and Newton’s physicalist theory of qualia, 
according to which colors and forms are physical properties or empirical 
dispositions of an object and cause a certain sensation in a normal perceiver, 
he explains perception not as subjective sensation, but as arising from the 
objective change of sensual stimuli as well as from the “knowledge” about 
this. Noë recognizes that such a sensationalist theory could not serve as an 
appropriate phenomenological explanation of perception, since colors are 
dispositions of objects only in relation to the change of their appearance under 
certain circumstances.20 
Only on the margin, Noë notes that “understanding” of sensual stimuli 
is necessary for perception, and since the basic form of understanding is a 
concept, perception is “conceptual” in the Kantian sense, that is, not an 
“explicit deliberative judge,”21 not something general independent of context, 
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but rather judgeable and intentional, “thoughtful,” “a way of thinking about 
the world.“22 Noë takes understanding by means of concepts to be a practical 
faculty, assuring that his thesis that perception is conceptually informed does 
not intend to over-intellectualize perception.23 
So far so good. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty would agree on a large scale 
with most of what is said above but, a I will show in the next sections, they 
claim much more than that. Let us begin with Husserl’s phenomenological 
analysis of perception. 
 
Husserl’s Phenomenology and Enactive Perception 
Husserl spent much of his lifetime to deal with questions of perception. 
Much of what the enactivists are saying about the role of self-motion in 
perception Husserl had already said in a lecture from 1907 called “Thing and 
Space,”24 where he analyzes the role of kinesthesis for the constitution of 
objects and the constitution of space,25 in his studies of Phenomenological 
Psychology26 and in Ideas II, where he argues that both the visual field and the 
tactile field along with motion sensations play a major role in the act of 
perception. He also emphasizes the interaction between the living body (Leib) 
and the surrounding world (Umwelt). Perception, in its turn, plays a leading 
role in the constitution of “animal nature” and even its “psychic reality.”27 
However, this is only half of the story told in Ideas II. Noë’s story stops, 
precisely after two thirds of Husserl’s work, after section two “The 
Constitution of Animal Nature,” while not taking the next and last step into 
section three “The Constitution of the Spiritual World,” the world of persons. 
The differentiation begins where Husserl draws a precise distinction between 
the spiritual world, the world of a spirit (Geist) as a community of spirits, in 
which the human being is regarded as a person, a “social being,” connected 
with other persons, indeed not only as a natural individuality.28 Husserl 
distinguishes between the “personalistic world,” the life-world of human 
beings, and the naturalistic world, the animal world. Each world is 
constituted upon its own specific “attitude” (Einstellung). At the final stage, 
Husserl unambiguously postulates the “ontological priority of the spiritual 
world over the naturalistic.”29 Remember that Husserl intended his 
phenomenology to be an a priori descriptive science, a “rigorous science” 
(strenge Wissenschaft), a kind of meta-science for all sciences, ergo for the 
humanities too, and this against the psychologistic approach to the 
“empirical” origin of logical rules in the logic at his times and against the 
naturalistic conceived psyche in the psychology, again at his times. 
So, given all that, there is perhaps not a sharp disagreement between 
Husserl and enactivism at first glance, but there is truly a major part that is 
completely missing in the enactive approach, a huge piece of thought. Noë 
tries to explain so much with the concept of self-motion, where it explains too 
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little. If one overestimates the power of movement one risks the mystification 
of this concept. As a declared naturalist, Noë’s worry is surely to avoid any 
“unnatural process,” “immaterial medium” or “unscientific spiritualism,”30 as 
if these are the only existing alternatives to naturalism. The phenomenological 
method consciously intends to leave the “naturalistic attitude” behind itself 
and apply the “personalistic attitude.” In what follows I will try to outline 
roughly this transformation of thought which Husserl initiated in his 
transcendental phenomenology in Ideas I.31 
The difference between enactivism and Husserl lies in Husserl’s method 
of “transcendental reduction” which does not reduce anything, but rather 
points and leads to the “transcendental I,” the “pure I,” as a subject, an 
expression of the spirit, of a person, which is the condition of the possibility 
of such a world. Reducere, literally “leading back,” means showing the origin 
of something, exposing the cause or reason of something. Without this 
reduction, the individual I, like the subject of enactive perception, always 
amounts to the natural psyche, a living thing having anima, an “animal,” as 
dealt in psychology. It is rather the transcendental phenomenology though, 
not just psychology, that allows for the more philosophical questions 
concerning the truth of perception, the essence of the absolute, the freedom of 
consciousness and the experience of the self. Husserl’s “transcendental I” as 
the subjectivity of the “pure ego” is the very condition for the possibility of 
perception itself, thus a “subjective” condition. I reach this point after I 
perform the epochè, the “eidetic reduction,” where I exclude or put in the 
brackets the “natural attitude” that I have towards the pre-given world, as I 
understand that I am overloaded with subjective opinions, feelings and 
prejudices. By “parenthesizing” the “general thesis” of naturalism, which 
means its naïve faith in the “natural” existence of the outer world, as an object 
dependent from consciousness and simply “in itself,” the phenomenological 
analysis aims at the “things themselves” and their Wesen, their essence in the 
sense of their whatness and how it exposes itself for consciousness, as 
pheinomena with various ways of being “given.” This enterprise was all 
about overcoming the naturalistic approach to the mind. To say that 
perception is only enactive is to ignore another kind of perception, namely 
Husserl’s “categorical perception” that enables the phenomenal “view of the 
essence” (Wesenschau), the original aim of the phenomenological inquiry. 
Categorical perception is that which lets us see something as something in the 
first place. Since perception in Husserl’s phenomenology is the fundamental 
mode of givenness and thereby our access to the world, his question is exactly 
how to arrive at a non-naturalistic understanding of perception. This 
transcendental engagement is not to be found in this form in the enactive 
theoretical attempts. 
As we have seen, the enactive perception turns mostly about the 
condition of self-motion and the expectations that knowledge about 
sensorimotor contingencies generates, so that some questions arise: What 
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does Noë understand by “understanding”? Which concept of concept does he 
hold? If cognitive phenomena have components outside the skull and the 
body, what kind of components are these? How does he conceive of the 
difference between animal and human perception? Noë’s concept of concept 
is very wide construed and somewhat misconceiving. Surprisingly, Noë 
designates perception as “conceptual,” since he believes that there are basic 
“natural” concepts that we somehow naturally possess, like “this is red,” just 
because we are able to see. Accordingly, he designates the behavior of a 
chimpanzee who wanted more and more jelly beans as “conceptual,” because 
she understood the concept “more.”32 In a similar context, he designates the 
positive relationships between apes and other members of their group as 
“conceptual and inferential skills.”33 Strictly speaking, however, such “skills” 
can be seen as born biological instincts, and it cannot be absolutely proven 
whether this kind of “action” is to be understood as behaving upon instincts 
(Verhalten) or acting upon free will (Handeln). Due to the silence of the 
chimpanzee this question must be kept open and the debate cannot be 
decided for the chimpanzee in her name. The designation of natural 
comportment as action attests rather to a confusion than a new action theory. 
In fact, Noë’s premises are not wholly consistent with his own disapproval of 
Ryle’s methodological behaviorism that takes perception to be a disposition 
of behavior.34 After all, a purely physicalist view of perception cannot prove 
along its own terms that cats perceive exactly like humans. Such reduced 
concept of concept bears too little content, if it does not refer us to categorical 
knowledge that lets us understand something as something in the first place, 
a priori, and so in its essence.  
Noë’s considerations can be read as his attempt to solve the 
phenomenological problem of perceptual presence posed by Husserl: How 
can we conceive the factual presence (or co-presence) of the unperceivable? In 
Husserl’s terminology, we can never capture any spatial object entirely, since 
we always take a certain direct perspective to “fill it out” (erfüllen), which 
practically conceals other sides of it, other “profiles,” by “shading” 
(Abschattung). Yet, although we can “intuitively experience” (erleben) only one 
side of the object, we do actually “experience” (erfahren) the whole of it and 
gain consciousness of it. Perception always includes the “appresentation” of 
the hidden aspect of an object and we can “co-intend” or “co-mean” 
(mitmeinen) the implicit sides of the object, which are not perceptually given, 
because the perceptually given sides refer (verweisen) to it by means of the 
“referential context” (Verweisungszusammenhang) that connects the objects like 
in a chain, giving them meaning (Sinn). Husserl’s solution rests upon the idea 
of an open intersubjectivity as a meta-condition for objectivity in the broader 
context of intentionality: I understand emphatically that such hidden sides 
can be perceived by other potential I’s, other subjects, simply others. Noë’s 
solution to this problem remains empiricist, insofar as he explores this 
phenomenon under the psychological category of “amodal perception” 35 and 
concludes that the potential access to that which is not directly perceivable is 
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made possible thanks to learned sensorimotor abilities and to the expectations 
that result from them.36 His claim is that we can perceive the object in each 
situation thanks to our action: our successful movement towards the objects. 
“You just have to walk over there.”37 
Noë believes that perceptions of spatially given objects are the most solid 
basis for thinking about the world and hence expands the sense of the word 
“empirical” to include enactive perceptions as bearer of truth, whereas what 
is at stake is exactly the question whether true knowledge about the world 
can rely only on perceptions. Husserl’s concept of truth takes truth to be an 
over-empirical ideality,38 generated each time by a “community of human 
beings” (Menschengemeinschaft) that together creates the “history of human 
beings,” a “cultural world” of persons and a “cultural community.”39 Beyond 
the given naturality of consciousness we face the normativity of 
consciousness with its self-given norms, and beyond both there is perhaps the 
truth for both, in and for itself. The normativity of consciousness implies that 
knowledge claims are collectively verifiable and are indeed recurrently 
verified, whereby how we perceive our world is epistemologically 
determined and conditioned by established institutes of knowledge, 
transmission of knowledge from generation to generation, the exchange of 
cultural traditions, and the like. Due to this status of perception, in contrast to 
mere natural processes, perception can be erroneous and fail, mislead and 
deceive. The gaze can disparage, exploit and repress. Perception is, after all, 
amount to an opinion or doxa, or what Husserl called “pretension,” not the 
whole truth itself, not Wahrheit, but Wahrnehmung, taking something to be 
true. To judge the quality of human perception it is required to go beyond the 
individual level of consciousness, because the systemic dependence of social 
groups on each other - the social structure - does not appear subsequent to the 
individual, but is a precondition for its existence. Neither the sociality of 
perception nor its subjectivity can be downplayed, since both stem from the 
ability of subjects to interact with each other and change their local reality, so 
that the question of freedom and free-will is involved as well. According to 
Husserl, with its own “free variation” of ideas and imagination, self-
consciousness transcends the pre-phenomenological “natural attitude” and is 
capable of creating signs and symbolism.  
Noë’s theory of perception does not take the sociocultural and historical 
embeddedness of human experience into account. The life-world is co-
constituted by other perceivers with different historical, temporal and 
linguistic views. Husserl dwells on the problems of concrete life-world of 
persons in his late generative phenomenology. Intersubjectivity is a 
precondition for mutual perception and perception of other minds. Albeit 
referring to Husserl’s phenomenology, the enactive approach remains 
naturalistic and to a certain degree reductionist, insofar as human perception 
is determined only by physical change of sensual stimuli and hence by “laws 
of sensorimotor contingency.”40 In this, Noë remains a loyal successor of 
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Dennett’s physicalism, despite his critique of Searle. Without the reference to 
the I’s subjectivity, the enactive approach can hardly explain why we perceive 
the same phenomena differently in different times, languages, cultures, 
genders, social classes, religions etc. Nonetheless, there are a few enactive 
theorists who cordially endorse the exploration of classical phenomenological 
themes, for example Thompson who attaches great importance to the process 
of enculturation, claiming that “[o]ne of the most important reasons that 
human mentality cannot be reduced simply to what goes on inside the brain 
of an individual is that human mental activity is fundamentally social and 
cultural.”41 Shaun Gallagher also points at this issue.42 Yet this is not enough. 
What is at stake here is the status of phenomenology. The enactive 
approach declares that it seeks “to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology”43 and it takes 
this project as a self-evident need, almost as zeitgeist. Given that, it’s no 
wonder that Noë’s declared intention is to develop a “natural philosophy of 
mind”44 and a “natural philosophy of consciousness.”45 The possibility of 
naturalizing phenomenology in the sense of objectifying subjective 
experience by means of “a formalization of a consciousness” with the help of 
new mathematical theories has been ostensibly confirmed.46 Yet, if Husserl’s 
phenomenology was notoriously all about counteracting naturalism in the 
first place, why do we have to “naturalize” phenomenology at all? As Helena 
De Preester rightly claims, “[a] naturalized phenomenology is no longer 
phenomenology.”47 In this sense, enactivism is just another form of 
naturalism. By “natural,” enactivists do not mean a general structure or a form 
in the sense of a generic logical meta-category, but rather the externally pre-
given and presupposed totality of sensually detectable stimuli and purely 
material entities. Although Noë attempts to deliberate on perception as a 
whole, his use of the word corresponds to the rhetorical figure of a 
synecdoche, as he speaks for the most part of animal perception but says 
“perception.” Insofar as he permanently refers to the “sensory contact with 
the world”48 in a narrow sense, he reduces the idea of “world” (Welt) to 
“environment” (Umwelt) as physical nature, again another synecdoche. 
Scheler has pointedly critiqued this confusing tendency and offered a 
phenomenological account of this problem.49  
We now turn to Merleau-Ponty, who, like Husserl, also dealt extensively 
with the problems of perception by means of descriptive phenomenology, 
albeit in different ways. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s Approach to Perception 
Undoubtedly, Noë was inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
perception as getting in touch with the world, “contacting” it and testing it,50 
when he adopted Merleau-Ponty’s famous paradigm of perception as a tactile 
sense, not as sense of sight. He shares Merleau-Ponty’s critique at the outset 
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of Phenomenology of Perception, namely his refutation of the empiricist 
conception of perception as a mechanic sensation, or as pure receptivity of 
sense data, and his conclusion that the physiological functioning of the 
sensory apparatus alone, without the functions of the surrounding world, 
cannot sufficiently explain perception.51 Merleau-Ponty also rejects there the 
rationalist (intellectualist) conception of perception as “interpretation” of a 
pre-given meaning, as a conscious “apperception”52 or as a “rational 
construction” made by “immaterial spirit” and suggests instead that 
perception ought to be considered from a bodily point of view, as it is the 
given situation of a living subject that is interlaced (entrelacs) with the 
“world.” He characterizes perception as the primordial openness to this pre-
reflective life-world, as “being to the world” (être au monde). All in all, the 
enactive approach would subscribe to this.  
However, the question is how do we understand this “world.” Merleau-
Ponty goes a step further and directly attacks scientism, particularly the 
prejudice of every positivistic science that fabricates a world of objects wholly 
detached from the conscious mind and from the scientist herself, an “objective 
world,”53 which is not far away from Husserl’s “general thesis of naturalism.” 
Merleau-Ponty, like Husserl and unlike Noë, does not deny or repress the 
subjective aspect of perception but rather criticizes that the misconceived 
understanding of perception as sensation is just another example for “the 
recently introduced object of scientific consciousness,” which is an imaginary 
object that “conceals rather than reveals subjectivity.”54 Merleau-Ponty argues 
that the question of perception must be therefore interlinked with that of 
consciousness’ self-reflection: How can consciousness grasp itself?55Again 
like Husserl and unlike Noë, he does not grasp the question of perception as 
separated from the question of a concrete consciousness, let alone of self-
consciousness. Perception is not purely subjective, but it does stem from the 
original inner experience of a body-subject that constitutes its own objects of 
perception while being in the world. 
This issue of subjectivity has consequences for the way the act of 
perceiving is described each time. Merleau-Ponty characterizes perceiving in 
terms of focusing on a figure emerging against a less determined background, 
from which it gets differentiated, while getting more and more determined 
through our “sense-giving,” what Husserl designated as Sinngebung. 
Interestingly, the same idea of the increase of determinations is used by Hegel 
in Science of Logic to describe a dialectic development, only that in Hegel it 
meant the whole process of determination which begins with the 
undetermined “pure Being” and ends with the fully self-determined 
“absolute Mind.” In Merleau-Ponty’s logic, the factuality of perception cannot 
be explained by that which is “empirically given” or by “rational 
construction,” exactly because it is all about “creating” the “sense” of 
something, “giving” it a meaning.56 Perception is not just about discovering 
some pre-given “sense” hidden in the things, but rather a dialectical 
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“founding of being.”57 In the enactive approach, however, the act of focusing 
is said to happen through the sheer physical movement towards the objects. 
The process of perceiving is not described dialectically. The question of 
“sense” does not take a central position and does not obtain a thorough 
analysis. 
Merleau-Ponty stands thus in a long philosophical tradition that warns 
that dogmatic naturalistic commitments in the research might conceal the 
basic “original phenomena,” our very “world of culture,” the “human world,” 
the “home of our thought,”58 where we commonly find ourselves at ease and 
at home, in contrast to nature which is for us a rather vague and remote entity. 
This idea too in some modification can be traced back to Hegel.59 Merleau-
Ponty knows and relates to Hegel’s philosophy, when he employs the 
Hegelian concept of “objective spirit” in his critique of empiricism, arguing 
that “for the empiricism there is not such a thing as objective spirit,”60 that is, 
there is not such a thing as “the memory of the community of thinkers.”61 
Merleau-Ponty read Hegel, just as he read Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler and 
Marx. This paramount scholarship is typical for this phenomenological 
tradition. The enactive approach on its part remains faithful to analytic 
standards and cognitive science, even when it comes to deal with issues that 
concern social cognition and “linguistic bodies.” It is not by accident that 
enactivists speak more of “organisms” and “animals,” and less of “persons” 
or “human beings.” By “mind” they mean the individual mind of a single 
person, the intelligence of an animal. 
If so, despite some philosophical differences from Husserl, on which we 
cannot dwell here in details, Merleau-Ponty draws on the same crucial 
distinction of the “world of persons” dealt by Husserl, for example, when he 
discusses the constitution of symbolism in language, arguing: “There is here 
nothing resembling the famous naturalistic conceptions which equate the 
artificial sign with the natural one, and try to reduce language to emotional 
expression. The artificial sign is not reducible to the natural one, because in 
man there is no natural sign […]”62 The cultural world is taken by both 
phenomenologists to be the ground and horizon for our activities, not just the 
physical world. Their phenomenology treats the body as the living body one 
owns, as Leib, what Merleau-Ponty renders as corps propre. The Leib is not just 
the biologically understood body, but the mediation between matter, soul, 
and spirit, the speaking-thinking body that creates its own artificial world and 
inhabits it, lives in it. Therefore, the body, so understood, is even historically 
shaped, not just evolutionarily. Ken Pepper has referred to this issue: “There 
is therefore what might be described as a ‘historical’ dimension to the 
phenomenon of sensorimotor understanding which cannot be adequately 
captured by the language of commonsense psychology and ecological optics, 
to which Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology gives voice. And in so doing, it 
dissolves the worries incurred by Noë’s untenably impoverished account of 
the phenomena.”63 A view that considers the human body mainly under the 
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aspect of an external moving object among other external moving objects, 
distorts and disfigures the substantial idea of Leib, as there cannot be an 
externality without internality. To be sure, for Merleau-Ponty, the animal is a 
higher form of existence, yet “another existence,”64 or “order,” another form 
of “being to the world.” He distinguishes between the immediate real form of 
the existence “in itself” (“centripetal”) and the mediated intelligible form of 
the existence “for itself” (“centrifugal”),65 while paraphrasing Hegel about 
nature and spirit. There too, spirit can go beyond nature and reach itself, while 
nature cannot go beyond itself in the same sense. This is a form of 
transcendental commitment in Merleau-Ponty’s anti-naturalistic 
phenomenology. Let us hear his thoughts about this in his own words: 
The use a man is to make of his body is transcendent in 
relation to that body as a mere biological entity. It is no 
more natural, and no less conventional, to shout in anger or 
to kiss in love than to call a table ‘a table’. Feelings and 
passional conduct are invented like words. Even those 
which, like paternity, seem to be part and parcel of the 
human make-up are in reality institutions. It is impossible 
to superimpose on man a lower layer of behaviour which 
one chooses to call ‘natural’, followed by a manufactured 
cultural or spiritual world.66 
The naturalistic approach defines perception as animal perception and 
hence does not differentiate between animal and human perception, taking 
the difference to be quantitative, not qualitative, only gradually shaped, 
different in “degree.”67 Noë’s assimilationist epistemology considers, for 
example, as a fact that animals and babies enjoy exactly the same full 
perceptual experience of human adults. Undoubtedly, humans also possess 
animal unconscious prototypes of perception, such as vigilance, awareness 
and attention, utilizing similar exteroceptive and interceptive sensory organs. 
As explained before, there is a sense in which it is true to say that this kind of 
perception is “enactive.” Yet the complete concept of perception also contains 
a form of conscious perception with a certain direction that is intersubjectively 
shaped as a we-relation to the world, shared attention or joint attention. 
Human perception requires more than animal perception, insofar as it 
involves the process of creating shared meaning through signs and 
significations, and this process is, in turn, also engaged in that of giving 
meaning to oneself. If a theory of perception comprises only the necessary 
conditions for animal perception, but neglects other sufficient conditions for 
human perception, then its standpoint confronts only one “profile” of the 
phenomenon of perception, only one perspective, which is being 
“absolutized” to represent the whole of the phenomenon. 
Perceptual experience is a typical object of phenomenological 
contemplation, not only because of the transcendental condition of its 
possibility, but also because it is conceptualized there in terms of its existential 
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meaning for human life. Taylor Carman illuminates the methodological 
difference between enactivists and phenomenologists in his observation that 
Merleau-Ponty “is concerned with perception not as a purely mental or 
cognitive operation, but as an aspect of human existence that conditions and 
situates thought.”68 Merleau-Ponty accentuates the existential meaning of 
perception when he characterizes it as a form of habituality, as a feeling of 
familiarity and closeness, as that which “ties us to a world as if to our 
homeland.”69 This thought is however not without a critical moment, for 
unlike Noë, who wishes to see the foundations of science in perception itself, 
Merleau-Ponty does not consider perception as the beginning of science at all, 
but rather “classical science” as a form of perception, only that science has 
forgotten that it is a form of perception, because it imagines that is has already 
been completed.70 Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception is at the 
same time a critique of perception. 
 
On the Late Merleau-Ponty and the “Radical Enactive 
Approach” 
Let us give a thought about the late Merleau-Ponty, as it was claimed that 
his notion of “flesh” (chair) in The Visible and the Invisible is a radical conception 
of enactive cognition.71 I argue that this is the case, only if we understand by 
“flesh” the common meaning of the word and not that of Merleau-Ponty. In 
his late ontological writings Merleau-Ponty finds a new expression for the 
intertwining of perceiver and perceived, of self and world. When he 
postulates that “the human body is symbolism”72 he means that even in the 
“pre-predicative” level of perception our body can be understood in terms of 
“language,” a system of symbols. There is nothing “enactive” for Merleau-
Ponty about symbolism since the act of signifying belongs to the human 
sphere, not the “natural,” as we learned before. Brain, body, and nature alike 
are embedded in the same material realm, the “flesh,” but it just means that 
they are a part of a larger, all-encompassing unity. This monist-like claim is 
fundamentally ontological, not epistemological. It does not reduce human 
language to a sensorimotor capacity, even if the chosen terminology is 
debatable. The ontological claim as such is more foundational: the 
intertwining that occurs due to the structure of “chiasm,” due to the 
“reversibility” of the senses (reciprocal or self-touching), points to the 
underlying interconnectedness of everything. This movement is more than 
just me enacting my environment, more than an ego rooted successfully in a 
physical world. When Merleau-Ponty argues that in the intimate contact 
between painter and environment, in moments when we paint a landscape or 
portrait, “it becomes impossible to distinguish between what sees and what 
is seen, what paints and what is painted,”73 he actually makes a strong claim 
about how everything that is perceivable has a certain “bodily” being, of 
course not anatomically, but so that every being can be closely intermeshed 
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with another being. This does not necessarily imply a way of acting, but a way 
of being in relation to the world. Merleau-Ponty describes this intermeshing 
of seer and seen as a certain way of being conscious and exchanging thought 
with the world, in the following way: “[…] I abandon myself to it, I plunge 
into this mystery, and it ‘thinks itself in me.’ I am this sky that gathers 
together, composes itself, and begins to exist for itself, my consciousness is 
saturated by this unlimited blue.”74 This interrelatedness, which is central to 
the later notion of “flesh,” is already at work in the early Merleau-Ponty and 
is part of the effort to overcome the dualism object-subject. 
And there is more to this. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges, Unlike Noë, that 
perception can be grasped as passivity, and demonstrates it with the notion 
of “flesh,” as John Jenkins argues: 
First, by articulating the reversibility that grounds the 
chiasm between body and world in terms of activity and 
passivity, bodily being in the world provides an account of 
our being in the world that is not one-sidedly activist. 
Instead, the chiasmic relationship between activity and 
passivity in perception reveals the sense in which the body 
is both active in perception and passively open to the 
world, so that “consciousness” is chiasmically grounded in 
world and body.75 
Jenkins concludes that “[a]dopting the conceptual framework of flesh allows 
for an account of perception that is not strictly active because it integrates the 
passive dimensions of perception as well, e.g. through the incorporation of 
passive touch into tactile perception.”76 This becomes plausible if we keep in 
mind that percipere contains both an active mode of doing, namely grasping 
in the sense of seizing, reaching and touching, as well as a reactive mode of 
doing, which is more passive, namely capturing in the sense of taking or 
catching. There is a certain boundary between acting and perceiving, as long 
as people with damaged locomotive system can indeed perceive the world, 
just as blind people perform successful actions in the world. As Jenkins is 
offering in his profound analysis, with the help of the late Merleau-Ponty 
some revisions must be taken in order to make the framework of enactivism 
more appropriate for phenomenology.77 
 
A Note on the Dialectical Movement and Critical 
Phenomenology 
As long as the enactive approach is firmly committed to a naturalizing 
framework, it runs the risk of abolishing its access to phenomenology and 
hence of abandoning its own theoretical framework in a destructive kind of 
dialectical movement. A similar dialectical development is to be found in 
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Merleau-Ponty’s work The Adventures of Dialectics, though transferred to the 
political dimension. It would be fruitful for future cognitive theorists to take 
notice of this dialectical conception of perception and perhaps as a consequent 
push their theoretical praxis more to the phenomenological and post-
phenomenological direction. The recent enactive work of Di Paolo, et. al. 
Linguistic Bodies (2018) comes very close to this idea, as it takes our bodies not 
only as organic and sensorimotor, but mainly as “linguistic bodies.” The 
question set there is: “[C]an we go from dynamic embodied processes to 
grounding ideas such as grammar, utterances, signs, symbols, etc.? There is a 
gap between these vocabularies. One of our goals is to fill in this gap.”78 This 
work even embraces a dialectical approach and takes Merleau-Ponty’s 
dialectics seriously.79 Nevertheless, the researchers insist on the common 
“naturalistic” framework, a mantra repeated incessantly like a shibboleth 
amount the proponents of the enactive approach, this time in order to rule out 
the view that the body is only a “product of language,” a view held by 
practically no one, which they label “antinaturalism.”80 Linking the linguistic 
mind with bodily motion, those researchers believe that these are “exciting 
times for the sciences of the mind” because of “the explosion of novel 
technologies, sophisticated models, and analytic tools that allow the study of 
bodies in action.”81 Just a side question: If one insists on the continuity 
between nature and mind, and one rejects dualism, then it is not clear why it 
is necessary to use such an ism-word like “naturalism,” and why not 
“mentalism” or “spiritualism” or whatsoever. When it comes to describing 
the mental and the mental capacities, one-sided-ism does not seem to do 
justice to the issue of continuity. 
At this stage, it would be fair to suggest that phenomenology is not 
everywhere forgotten or in a need of resuscitation in view of the critical-
phenomenological studies of gendered and racialized embodiment that have 
been recently published.82 With Merleau-Ponty in the background, they argue 
that habits of perception carry and sustain “sedimented sociality,”83 which is 
why it is not adequate to analyze human capacities, such as perception, in a 
neutral abstract way, detached from any “historical specificity.”84 They go 
further to claim that the classical phenomenologists in fact downsize their 
own specific personal embeddedment, using banal examples for persons and 
objects and so not living up to their own standards, a bias to which they would 
like to provide a corrective.85 Taken in this post-phenomenological direction, 
a self-aware inquiry into situated agency can become a powerful vehicle in 
the field of critical thought. 
 
Conclusion 
There are several issues on which enactivism and phenomenology fairly 
converge, but there are even more issues on which they completely diverge. 
Some ideas of the enactive approach stem from traditional analytic 
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philosophy and consist of affirmations along with negations of it. Its reference 
to phenomenology embodies the aspiration to go beyond itself in a dialectical 
process of becoming. In its reference to continental phenomenology enactivist 
theorists attempt to build a bridge between cognitive science and 
phenomenological thought, so that its merit is at any rate putting 
phenomenology, which was thought to be dead, at least in some quarters, 
back on the map. 
Dealing with the enactive approach to perception bestows us with an 
excellent opportunity to set the question of perception once again, this time 
from a post-cognitivist standpoint, in relation to phenomenology and post-
phenomenology, and in contrast to a new sophisticated form of physicalist 
naturalism. In the reawakening and recalling of Husserl’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological works we rediscover the naturalistic arguments 
about perception and consciousness which they confronted themselves. 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty would not be reluctant to join the enactivist attack 
on the neuroscientific stance in cognitive science. The enactive perception 
adequately describes the animal perception and the necessary conditions for 
its emergence, but the problem is that this is not sufficient for the description 
of human perception, categorical perception and self-perception. Compared 
with phenomenology, the enactive approach sets the focus only on the 
physiological conditions of perception, not on its sociocultural 
embeddedness. The phenomenological way of thinking, its language and its 
objectives, remain de facto external and extraneous to the enactive approach, 
“the other,” the other side of itself.  
The oblivion of phenomenology, as perceived by those who speak with 
enthusiasm about the comeback of phenomenology, is interconnected with 
the evasive attitude of cognitive science concerning the inquiry into the 
historical and social dimensions of consciousness and perception. At the same 
time, it is disconnected from the enduring reception of phenomenology in 
other directions and disciplines. The genuine features of the forgotten 
transcendental or existential phenomenology can be rediscovered at any 
moment by anybody, also by “analytic” thinkers. Yet, in a tradition of 
thought, in which the philosophical methodology itself exhibits anti-historical 
characteristic, otherized traditions of thought like phenomenology, only a 
hundred years old, are perceived like a prehistory of thought and scarcely as 
genuinely “rigorous science.” 
Admittedly, there are difficult conceptual indeterminacies regarding the 
perceptive transition of sensations into cognition and perhaps the full 
understanding of perception has not been reached yet. The question of the 
ontological status of perception is a philosophical one and the debate on this 
issue should to be kept open. The question of perception touches the problem 
of human freedom with regard to the possibility of free sense-making, free 
“sense-giving,” giving meaning to one’s own existence on the grounds of 
perceptions and misperceptions. The question of free will cannot be dealt with 
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here, but for now it became perhaps clear that cognition science ought not be 
left to the hands of scientists alone, just as the hands of theorists of perception 
ought not to refrain from some phenomenological work. 
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